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Rival Claims to "Truth"
by
ELEANOR SWFT*
Professor Sherman J. Clark asserts in his article To Thine Own
Self Be True: Enforcing Candor in Pleading Through the Party
Admissions Doctrine1 that factual statements made in a party's prior
pleadings-whether amended or superseded, from prior cases
involving the same facts, hypothetical or alternative, or involving
third party joinder-should be admissible in on-going litigation
against that party, subject only to the general requirements of
Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403. And why not? As we
know, such prior pleadings are hearsay when offered to prove the
truth of the factual statements made. But, Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2) exempts from the ban on hearsay a party's own statements
that are offered against that party. And this exemption includes, as
Professor Clark points out, statements made by a party's attorney,
who is an authorized agent. So it seems unremarkable that prior
pleadings should be admissible against the pleading party, if relevant
and not excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. And most
courts agree, according to Professor Clark?
Yet, respected commentators assert the opposite-that factual
statements made by a party in prior pleadings should not be
admissible against that party at trial. These commentators claim that
the specter of admissibility deters parties from pleading all of their
* Professor of Law, School of Law (Boalt Hall), University of California at
Berkeley.
1. Sherman J. Clark, To Thine Own Self Be True: Enforcing Candor in Pleading
Through the Party Admissions Doctrine, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 565 (1998).
2. See id. at 566.
3. As described by Professor Clark, some courts acknowledge that a trial judge has
discretion to exclude a party's prior pleadings under Rule 403. Clark, supra note 1, at
569-70. Judicial concern about the unfair prejudice that justifies exclusion is not,
however, well-defined. Professor Clark supports the application of Rule 403 to the
admission question. See icL at 583. He proposes exclusion when the allegations are
statements of legal theories rather than statements of fact. See id. at 567. He argues that
"unfair prejudice" exists when an allegation contains "technical, legal terminology with a
precise meaning or legal significance might not be appreciated by the fact-finder." Id. at
582. This risk would be better analyzed under Rule 403 as "misleading the jury," as I
discuss infra Part VI.
4. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE ACTIvITY OF PARTY § 257 (John W. Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992); MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.26 (3d




possibly meritorious claims-including hypothetical and alternative
claims, as permitted under the liberal pleading regime of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e).' The purposes of litigation would be
better served, they believe, by a bright line rule of exclusion that
protects parties from use at trial of any damaging assertions of fact
made previously by them in formal pleadings.
This comment focuses on the dispute between Professor Clark
and those who advocate a wholesale bar against the admission of
factual statements in prior pleadings. It briefly explores how we
might think about choosing between these conflicting positions. It
poses questions that can be applied to evaluating a variety of disputes
about evidence rules that involve competing claims between "truth"
and its rivals.
1. What Are the Rival Claims?
Professor Clark asserts that the admission of prior pleadings will
serve the value of "truth" in the adversary system. This is not, it
seems, because he thinks that admitting prior pleadings will provide
information to the factfinder that increases the rationality of its
decision. Indeed, Professor Clark appears to eschew any reliability-
based argument for admission.6 Rather, he believes that admission of
prior pleadings will serve truth because it will improve parties'
adherence to the requirements of "honest pleading" under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11.' It will deter parties from pleading
practices that ill serve our justice system, including the pleading of
"baseless allegations, or ... pleadings intended to harass adversaries
or cause delay."8 Such pleadings, presumably in violation of Rule 11,
are the "major potential difficulty" with liberal pleading rules.9
Admitting them against the pleading party later is "our best line of
5. See, e.g., Mansfield, supra note 4, at 711-12 ("[T]he admissibility of pleadings
against the pleader may affect a party's readiness to plead at all on certain issues and to
put before a tribunal for determination, possibly in his favor, contentions in respect to
which he does have a reasonable factual basis.").
6. See Clark, supra note 1, at 565. This comment evaluates Professor Clark's claim
in his own terms. Yet, it should be acknowledged that the admissibility of prior pleadings
increases the amount of relevant evidence presented to the factfinder, and should
therefore increase the accuracy of the factfinder's decision. Indeed, if such prior pleaded
statements are inconsistent with the party's current theory of the case, they may be highly
probative. Since the central premise of the Federal Rules of Evidence is that the
admission of more, rather than less, probative evidence yields more accurate factfinding,
the admission of prior pleadings is supported by our traditional understanding of how best
to serve the value of "truth" in the adversary system.
7. See id. at 567.
8. Id. at 574.
9. Id at 575.
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defense against the abuse of liberal pleading rules.... Make what
factual allegations you choose, says our pleading system, but keep in
mind you may be asked to explain them."10
This is an instrumental argument. It asserts that an evidence
rule admitting prior pleadings will deter undesirable out-of-the-
courtroom behavior, and that the long-term effect on "truth" of this
deterrence is an important justification for the rule.
The opposing position, which prefers exclusion of prior
pleadings, also relies on an instrumental claim about out-of-the-
courtroom behavior.1 It asserts that admission of such pleadings will
detract from the search for truth because it will overly deter parties
from pleading factual theories for which they do have a reasonable
basis. Parties will not want prior pleadings-particularly factual
allegations in support of alternative theories-used against them later
should those theories turn out to be wrong.2
Both positions, therefore, rely on the instrumental justification
of promoting "truth," defined more broadly by Professor William
Twining as "rectitude of decision," which he describes as "the correct
application of valid substantive laws to facts established as true."'3
Choosing between these two positions requires evaluation of two
different ways in which rectitude of decision-the value of "truth" in
adjudication-is better served: by reducing the excesses of
"unconstrained pleading"'4  or by encouraging the judicial
consideration of all of a party's possibly meritorious claims.
10. Id.
11. Professor John Mansfield states the justification for a bright line rule in terms of
predicting the instrumental effect of exclusion: "If conduct of the parties [for purposes of
this comment, liberal pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e)] furthers an
important objective of the litigation process and there is a substantial likelihood that this
conduct will be deterred by the threat of evidential use, the evidence should be
excluded.... if there is no significant likelihood of such an effect, the evidence should
come in." Mansfield, supra note 4, at 701-02.
12. Professor Mansfield's concern that a party may be discouraged from pleading all
of his potentially valid claims was articulated in an Eighth Circuit opinion overturning a
district court's admission of a dismissed pleading against the plaintiff: "A pleader in the
Federal Courts should not have to forego a potential claim rather than run the risk of
having such a claim used as an admission." Garman v. Griffin, 666 F.2d 1156, 1160 (8th
Cir. 1981).
13. WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 14
(1985). Professor Twining asserts that "implementation of substantive laws by the
determination of the truth about allegations of fact on the basis of evidence is a necessary
condition of achieving ... justice under the law." Id.
14. Clark, supra note 1, at 574.
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11. Do the Rival Claims Rely on Predictions of Out-of-the-
Courtroom Behavior?
Underlying both positions is the proponents' shared belief that
parties should make factual allegations in their pleadings only if they
have reasonable, substantial support;5 in short, that parties should
adhere to Rule 11. Resolving the conflict between them focuses on
conflicting predictions about pleading behavior at the margin of Rule
11. When a factual allegation may or may not "have evidentiary
support" after inquiry "reasonable under the circumstances,' 6 the
proponents predict behavior that, they believe, will affect the long-
run functioning of the justice system as a search for truth.
Professor Clark believes that without a rule generally admitting
prior pleadings, parties will more frequently be tempted to ignore the
requirements of Rule 11 and will draft and file unsupported
pleadings.' 7  An adjudication system flooded with baseless (and
perhaps harassing) allegations is the harm Professor Clark predicts if
there is not a rule of admissibility. The opposing commentators
predict the harm of a "chilling effect." Parties will not make
substantive claims (and defenses) that they could justly plead under
Rule 11 in fear of a rule of subsequent admissibility. 8
Which prediction is more accurate? Will fear of the future
impact of admission make the pleader exercise "honest caution" in
refraining from drafting unsubstantiated (and particularly harassing)
allegations? Or, will such fear promote a "fearful restraint" that
overly deters the filing of potentially meritorious claims?
How do we decide between these rival predictions?
i11. Are There Empirical Answers?
Empirical research might determine which prediction of
pleading behavior is more accurate. Two empirical questions are
raised by all attempts to justify evidence rules with claims about their
effects on out-of-the-courtroom behavior. First, do the relevant
actors know about the rule of evidence and understand its potential
15. See id. at 15-18; Mansfield, supra note 4, at 711-12.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).
17. See Clark, supra note 1, at 567, 576, 588-89.
18. "Maintaining the right to present to the tribunal for authoritative determination
all contentions for which a party has substantial support is an important objective of the
litigation process .... Mansfield, supra note 4, at 712. Professor Mansfield also
contends that a rule of admissibility will cause pleaders to avoid specificity in pleading,
thus disserving the "notice" function of pleading which relates to fairness values that are
also important in our litigation process. The chilling effect on substantive claims is,
however, his most important concern. Id. at 711-12.
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impact? Second, does this knowledge operate as an incentive or
deterrent on the actors' out-of-the-courtroom behavior?
On the first question of knowledge and understanding, a rule
concerning the admissibility of prior pleadings operates primarily on
attorneys who decide what factual statements to include in their
clients' pleadings. These attorneys are the relevant actors. They are
(we assume) educated in the basic rules of evidence; they have
learned (even if only to pass the bar exam) that their clients' own
statements (including authorized statements) may be admissible
against the client because not subject to the hearsay ban. Knowledge
of the potential future impact of pleadings is thus accessible to these
attorneys, although it may not be at the forefront of their minds.
However, this affirmative answer to the first question does not
resolve the dispute between the two rival predictions. Both assume
that such knowledge exists and will influence attorneys' behavior.
The second question asks whether the risk of future admission
operates as an important consideration in drafting factual statements
in pleadings. If it does not, then instrumental arguments over the
costs and benefits of a rule admitting prior pleadings should
evaporate.19 We would simply rely on Federal Rules of Evidence 401
and 403 to determine admissibility of prior pleadings-which ends up
being Professor Clark's preferred result. Only if future admissibility
is an operative consideration in drafting pleadings must we consider
whether it will push attorneys to "honest caution" or, even further, to
"fearful restraint."
The academic commentators in this dispute offer contradictory
predictions of how attorneys will behave. On what are their views
based? The context in which attorneys act makes prediction very
difficult. Various complex factors affect an attorney at the
moment(s) of drafting and filing a pleading. These include the
client's access to relevant facts; the resources available to the
attorney to conduct pre-filing investigation; the availability of neutral
sources of information; access to the opponent's facts; time
constraints, including the running of the statute of limitations; and
the skill, experience and ethical principles of the lawyer.
While these factors vary considerably from pleader to pleader,
and from case to case, they are not inaccessible to empirical research.
Could not some helpful information be gleaned from empirical
inquiry? At a minimum, if hypotheticals were developed, and
19. If risk of future admissibility does not operate as a deterrent or an incentive for
attorneys because it is not an important consideration at the moment of pleading, then it
will neither promote Professor Clark's desired compliance with Rule 11 nor reduce the
abuses of unconstrained pleading. But, neither will it have a chilling effect on the drafting
of possibly meritorious substantive claims.
Mar. 1998]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
seasoned (and perhaps unseasoned) trial attorneys were interviewed
about pleading practices, there might be some light shed on the
question whether the rule of admissibility, which most courts
currently employ, promotes the benefits claimed by Professor
Clark-"honest caution"-or the risk perceived by Professor
Mansfield-"fearful restraint." At a more ambitious level,
investigation of practices in competing jurisdictions are also possible.
Without any such information, it is difficult to know how to decide
which is the more accurate prediction.
IV. Should We Reject Instrumental/Empirical Justifications
for Evidence Rules?
In the face of uncertainty about the validity of competing
predictions about out-of-the-courtroom behavior, we might reject
instrumental arguments altogether as the basis for justifying evidence
rules. The behavior of attorneys would not be our concern; rather,
attention could focus solely on analysis of a prior pleading's
probative value versus its risks to accurate factfinding under Rule
403. The claim of serving truth would be limited to the goal of
increasing rational factfinding.
But instrumental arguments that evidence decisions can and do
affect out-of-the-courtroom behavior are common and, perhaps,
necessary. Refusing to take account of the effect of evidence rules
outside of the courtroom would further isolate the already artificial
world of adjudication from the social context within which it
operates. Moreover, the current trend seems to be more rather than
less attention paid to the real-world effects of evidence law.
Consideration of some other instrumental claims about evidence
rules may furnish analogies that help to resolve the dispute about
prior pleadings. Numerous evidence rules were developed at
common law to exclude a party's otherwise relevant admissions,
based on predictions of out-of-the courtroom behavior. Foremost are
privileges-statements made by a party in the context of specially
protected professional-client relationships, such as attorney-client,
clergy-communicant, psychotherapist-patient. Party admissions in the
form of a party's subsequent remedial measures, or offers to pay
medical expenses, were also excluded. And Professor Aviva
Orenstein recently argued in favor of excluding those party
admissions that could be construed to be "apologies," predicting that
such a rule would reward healing behavior and might even "make
claims go away" if the injured party were assuaged.2°
20. Aviva Orenstein, Gender and Race Considerations in Evidentiary Policy,
Presentation at the Joint Program of Sections on Evidence, Minority Groups and Women
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Protection of a party against these potentially damaging
admissions serves values that are "rivals" to truth-promoting (or at
least not deterring) valuable societal out-of-the-courtroom behavior
such as full and frank disclosures within privileged relationships and
beneficial behavior such as repairs and payments of medical
expenses. These instrumental justifications are accepted even
without empirical research to back them up."'
The Federal Rules of Evidence also rely on instrumental
justifications, in particular concerning the admissibility of a person's
prior sexual behavior when it is (or may be) only minimally relevant
to litigation. Rule 412 excludes much evidence of a sexual assault
claimant's prior sexual conduct in part to promote both the victims'
reporting of sexual assaults and the prosecutors' decisions to
prosecute such cases.' Both goals are predictions about out-of-the-
courtroom behavior. More recently enacted, Rules 413, 414, and 415
admit a defendant's past sexually assaultive conduct, again to
promote prosecution of such crimes." Professor Robert Mosteller
has argued that legislatures have enacted rules permitting evidence of
"battered woman syndrome" in order to shift "the balance of
advantage.., in litigation in favor of battered women who respond
violently to their batterers. '
Judicial application of Rule 403 may also be motivated by
effects on out-of-the-courtroom behavior. For example, both
admission of spoliation evidence and exclusion of carelessly
preserved forensic evidence may deter behavior that creates risks for
the integrity of the factfinding process.
If a party creates false favorable evidence, or tampers with or
destroys harmful evidence, proof of such acts of "spoliation" is often
in Legal Education at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools,
(Jan. 9, 1998).
21. These rules of exclusion are also justified by the low probative value of some of
the excluded admissions. At least for repairs and offers to pay expenses, probative value
may be low because of the ambiguity of the essential inference from the party's statement
or conduct to the party's belief in his or her guilt or fault. Privileged statements, however,
are probably not typically ambiguous and are thought to be highly probative.
22. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 4.15
(1995).
23. The original Senate proposal for Rules 413-415 stated that "the willingness of the
courts to admit similar evidence in prosecutions for serious sex crimes is of great
importance to effective prosecution in this area, and hence to the pubilc's security against
dangerous sex offenders." 137 CONG. REc. S3191-02, at S3238 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991).
24. Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence
Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461, 485 (1996). Professor Mosteller asserts that politics-predictions
of social outcomes favored by the community-lie behind this rule of admission: "[M]y
contention is that the substantive law of self-defense is being altered by changes in
evidentiary rules designed, in large part, to aid women who have engaged in self-help."
Id. at 486.
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admitted.25 It supports an inference that the party has a guilty
conscience and, hence, is guilty (or at fault). An instruction on this
inference may also be given to alert the jury to its importance. While
admission of spoliation on a case-by-case basis may only punish the
offender, appellate court rulings that establish a firm pro-admission
stance may send a message of deterrence: Such behavior harms the
integrity of the judicial process and will be punished through a rule of
admission. 6
A similar message may be sent when judges exclude forensic
evidence that has been handled carelessly by law enforcement
officials or technicians. Although the standard for authenticating
such evidence-such as blood samples, fingerprints, et cetera-is
quite lenient under Federal Rule of Evidence 901, Rule 403 can be
used to exclude it if the chain of custody and/or security against
tampering appear sloppy and risk-laden.27 In the words of the First
Circuit, courts are willing to tolerate a chain of custody that is"adequate-not infallible... [where] some links in the chain were
rusty, but none were missing .... 28 But discrepancies or gaps in a
chain that are unexplained by police or forensic labs can justify
exclusion.' Careless handling of forensic exhibits, without
justification, threatens the integrity (and the appearance of integrity)
of the justice system. Exclusion, even on a case-by-case basis,
operates as a punishment and as an incentive to law enforcement
(and other repeat players in criminal litigation) to do a better job at
preserving and securing evidence.
All of the above-discussed examples show how prevalent is the
use of predictions of specific out-of-the-courtroom behavior to justify
25. See e.g., McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 917-18 (3d Cir.
1985) (holding that the trial court's exclusion of evidence of possible subornation of
perjury by the plaintiff was reversible error). The McQueeny court brushed aside
concerns about probative value and stated that "[i]ntuition and the unanimity of the
commentators and numerous courts ... suggest.., that it is powerful evidence indeed."
Id. at 922-23. The court also required a showing of "particularized" danger of unfair
prejudice. Otherwise, the offending party's generalized claim of unfair prejudice could
effectively preclude admission of any spoliation evidence, an obviously unacceptable
result if the court has deterrence in mind. See id. at 923.
26. See id. at 922-23.
27. See, e.g., State v. Reese, 382 N.E.2d 1193, 1194-95 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that it was error for trial court to admit pills into evidence, where envelope into which
pills were placed was not marked by the police, the pills were of an ordinary character,
and the envelope was handled by six different people during a nine day span).
28. United States v. Ladd, 885 F.2d 954, 957 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding the admission
of blood sample taken from the body of alleged drug distributor, notwithstanding careless
handling in the chain of custody).
29. See id. at 957 (rejecting the admission of a blood sample due to erroneous
numbering by private labs).
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decisions to admit or exclude evidence. These predictions are,
however, uncertain. We know how the rules affect behavior," but we
do not know how much of an effect they will have.
Some degree of uncertainty about the magnitude of effect can be
tolerated under a cost-benefit analysis of such evidence rules. The
cost inherent in these rules is to "truth"; they exclude relevant
evidence or they admit evidence that may have an unfair prejudicial
effect on the factfinder. Either way, the rationality of outcomes on a
case-by-case basis may be decreased. This cost is justified in theory
by the societal value of the predicted out-of-the-courtroom behavior.
But the degree of uncertainty about what magnitude of the socially-
valued behavior will actually occur should at some point make us
unwilling to accept a rule of evidence that may detract from the
rationality of outcomes.
Uncertainty is less tolerable in the dispute about admitting a
party's prior pleadings because it concerns the very nature of the out-
of-the-courtroom effect; is it "honest caution" or "fearful restraint?"
One result is good, the other is bad. There is more cost and less
benefit when we cannot even know whether a positive or a negative
result will occur.
V. Other Values Increase Tolerance for Uncertainty
Some evidence rules are justified both by predictions of
instrumental effects and by other non-instrumental values and
principles. For example, there are constitutionally-grounded
exclusionary rules (rules excluding statements made without Miranda
warnings" and excluding evidence obtained through searches
conducted without probable cause) that serve values of individual
liberty and autonomy. Privileges are justified on the basis of the
value of privacy. Rule 412's prohibition against use of a victim's past
sexual behavior to prove consent is also grounded on privacy
interests of the individual. Admission of spoliation evidence and
exclusion of chains of custody with "missing links" uphold the
integrity of the judicial system and the individual actors' duties of
honesty and responsibility.
When important values such as these combine with instrumental
arguments in favor of an evidence rule, greater uncertainty of the
30. That is, exclusion of privileged communications and of evidence of repairs or
medical payments, and of sexual behavior of sexual assault victims will probably
encourage more communications, more repairs, more medical payments and more sexual
assault complaints; admission of prior sexual conduct of sexual assault defendants and of
acts of spoliation will probably encourage more sexual assault complaints and
prosecutions, and will probably deter the manufacture or despoiling of evidence.
Mar. 1998] RIVAL CLAIMS TO "TRUTH'
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instrumental effect of these rules on out-of-the-courtroom behavior is
and should be tolerated. The need to bolster the instrumental
argument with empirical evidence declines. When there are no such
other important values at stake, as with the exclusion of repair
evidence, for example, the lack of empirical evidence to support the
instrumental justification is a matter of concern.32
Perhaps, then, the dispute over the admissibility of prior
pleadings can be resolved by analyzing whether other important
values and principles are at stake here. Throughout his paper,
Professor Clark asserts that fairness is the primary justification for
admitting party admissions (including prior pleadings).33 It is "fair"
to hold parties responsible for their own statements in an adversarial
system of justice. Thus, if a party makes an unsubstantiated factual
allegation, it is "fair" to force the party to explain it later.4 Professor
Clark notes that Rule 11 allows parties the choice of specifically
identifying statements about which they are unsure (in particular if
they are unsure about which of two inconsistent statements might
actually be true) so long as the party has a reasonable belief that the
statements are likely to have evidentiary support after further
investigation.35  If parties fail to make this choice-either because
they do not specifically identify such allegations, or they make
allegations which are even less substantiated than this standard-
then it is "fair" to make them explain their conduct in a subsequent
trial.36
32. Exclusion of repairs cannot be justified by reference to such important values
and principles, and it is the most suspect of these instrumentally-grounded evidence rules.
See e.g., Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 407 as Applied to Products Liability: A Rule in
Need of Remedial Measures, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 283, 317-20 (1993) (summarizing
critiques of Rule 407 and stating that "[n]o empirical evidence exists to prove that
manufacturers behave the way the world presupposes.").
33. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 1, at 588 ("Thus, it is not only fair, but it is vital, that
citizens be permitted and encouraged to keep one another honest.")
34. In the opening paragraph of his paper, Professor Clark asserts that the doctrine
of admitting party admissions "is a product of the adversarial process " and quotes from a
treatise that emphasizes that "'it seems fair to put a party at risk that the trier will accord
full evidential force to his own statement unless he comes forward with explanation or
counter proof."' Id. at 565-66 (quoting MUELLER & 'KIRKPATRICK, supra note 22, §
8.31). Later he asserts that there are conditions within which pleadings are drafted:
"freedom of expression, opportunity for deliberation, and an awareness of an obligation
to be truthful-make it more, not less, fair to permit, if not require, parties to be
confronted with and to explain their own statements." Id. at 574.
35. Id. at 581 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3)).
36. Parties confronted with allegations that had no substantial basis when made are
not, according to Professor Clark, unfairly prejudiced. If parties have no legitimate basis
for an allegation, "then they [are] caught in a violation of Rule 11 and were legitimately
impeached for their willingness to file a baseless claim. If [they did have a basis, then the
opponent is] .. .well within his rights to introduce that statement for whatever it [is]
[Vol. 49
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However, there are fairness concerns on the other side as well.
As Professor Mansfield notes, greater generality and less specificity
in pleading-recommended by Professor Clark as an acceptable way
for a pleader to avoid making unsubstantiated factual statementse-
ill serves the goal of providing notice to the opponent. Although
pleadings no longer establish the specific issues to be tried, deliberate
generality seems less "fair" to the opponent who then has to do more
work to determine (and will worry more about) the gist of the
pleader's claim. Professor James Joseph Duane also points out in
correspondence to Professor Clark and myself that attorneys differ
considerably in their talent and skill at artful pleading.' A rule of
admissibility visits upon the client the pleading choices, inadequacies
and/or mistakes of the attorney. Of course most choices,
inadequacies and mistakes of lawyers are visited upon clients, but
including the artfulness of pleading seems, to Professor Duane,
unnecessarily unfair."
A rule of admissibility also appears to foster ethical principles of
honesty and candor to the court. It is dishonest (or less honest)
pleading that Professor Clark, and Rule 11, seek to deter. But the
opponents of the admissibility rule do not advocate dishonesty. Their
concern is ethical also-the attorney's duty to represent the client
competently and in the client's best interest. In this case, such duties
translate into alleging all possible claims (or defenses) which there is
reason to think may be meritorious, just as Rule 8(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allows.
So far, then, there does not seem to be a compelling argument
that resolves these rival assertions of fairness and ethical obligation.
VI. Return to Rule 403?
This comment demonstrates that the dispute over a rule
admitting a party's prior pleadings involves rival instrumental claims
to truth, rival predictions of out-of-the-courtroom behavior, and rival
assertions of other important values and principles. However, none
of these rivalries seems to have a clear winner. Thus, none of them
worth as substantive evidence of the fact." Id. at 586.
37. See id. at 584-85.
38. "[A]ttorneys demonstrate a breathtaking range of ability and imagination and
creativity in the drafting of pleadings-all in ways that no client could ever be fairly
expected to anticipate or understand." Correspondence from Professor James Joseph
Duane, Associate Professor of Law, Regent University Law School, to the author and
Professor Sherman J. Clark, Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School
(Oct. 9,1997) (on file with author).
39. "[W]e ought to design procedural rules so as to minimize the extent to which
parties will be unfairly penalized or advantaged by the wide disparity of their attorneys'
competence or cleverness or integrity." Id.
Mar. 1998]
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resolves the dispute. In such a case of stand-off, and in the
unfortunate absence of empirical evidence, resort is had to burdens
of proof.
In a dispute about whether to adopt a bright line rule excluding a
party's prior pleadings, the burden of persuading courts (and other
policy makers) should fall on those advocating exclusion. This is
because Rules 401, 402, and 403 establish the central premise of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which is to admit more, rather than less,
relevant evidence in the search for truth. A bright line rule that
excludes relevant evidence in all instances of its application violates
this central premise; it therefore has to be justified. And such a rule
can be justified when justification rests on an instrumental argument
that the rule will encourage desirable out-of-the-courtroom behavior.
It is the "bright line" nature of the rule, as opposed to a case-by-case
"balancing" rule of exclusion, that makes the instrumental arguments
work. But when rival instrumental claims, rival predictions of out-of-
the-courtroom behavior, and rival assertions of values and principles
in effect cancel each other out, a bright line rule of exclusion cannot
be justified.
Nor, of course, does the central premise of the Federal Rules of
Evidence require a bright line rule of admission. Rule 403 provides
grounds for exclusion of a party's prior pleadings on a case-by-case
basis." Indeed, the dispute over the admissibility of prior pleadings
reveals issues in the application of Rule 403 to prior pleadings that
neither side has adequately discussed.
Probative Value. The probative value of a party's prior pleading
must be carefully analyzed. A prior pleading can be relevant because
it adds a factual assertion that is omitted from, or inconsistent with,
what that party currently claims. Under this theory of relevance,
prior pleadings are offered to prove their truth. The necessary
inference is that the party (or the party's authorized agent) thinks (or
has a reasonable basis for thinking) that the allegation is true. If not
offered for their truth but to impeach the party, the inference
necessary for relevance is that the party is dishonest-because she is
now omitting facts, or changing her story, or had no basis for her
prior allegation in the first place.
In many cases, estimating the probative value of a prior pleading
on either of these theories is a fairly straight-forward task. However,
in some instances Rule 11 permits parties to make a factual statement
40. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID.
403.
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in pleadings that lacks a "reasonable basis" if it is specifically
identified as "likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery."41  Such a
statement would seem to lack probative value to prove the truth of
that fact. It does not reflect anyone's beliefs, or even anyone's
assessment that there are reasonable grounds for belief, in a true state
of facts. Professor Clark describes the necessary state of mind as
"some reason to believe that it might actually be true."42 This sounds
like a suspicion, and suspicions, even good faith suspicions, may be
only one cut above a party's "dreaming" about the facts.43 Even if the
"further investigation or discovery" does not yield evidentiary
support, it would seem that the allegation made with that state of
mind also does not support an inference that the party is dishonest.
Risk of Misleading the Jury. The danger to jury reasoning that
prior pleadings pose is best analyzed under Rule 403 as the risk of
misleading the jury. Professor Clark identifies this danger, but
describes it as "unfair prejudice."" He states that a prior allegation
may contain "technical, legal terminology whose precise meaning or
legal significance might not be appreciated by the fact-finder."45
Professor Clark is concerned that the factfinder will not understand
technical language, or will overvalue a statement which has only
"special, limited legal significance."" Professor Duane also expresses
concern that the jury not able to assess the probative value of a prior
pleading in a settled claim, or of inconsistent pleadings in civil cases.47
This concern is not best characterized as "unfair prejudice."
Unfair prejudice is a term usually used to describe the risk of a jury's
"improper" use of evidence.' While it is common parlance to lump
all of the Rule 403 risks under the term "prejudice," in fact, each risk
has a specific meaning. In general, a more precise use of Rule 403's
terminology should lead to a more careful analysis of the danger to
jury reasoning that is involved.
Under Rule 403, it is the risk of being "misleading" that best
captures the concerns shared by Professors Clark and Duane--"the
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).
42. Clark, supra note 1, at 580.
43. This is, of course, a reference to the now-famous "dream" statement of the
criminal defendant O.J. Simpson, which although admitted at trial, was subject to intense
controversy for its lack of probative value as well as its misleading context.
44. Clark, supra note 1, at 582.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Duane, supra note 43.
48. Improper in that the evidence provokes an irrelevant, emotional response or may
be used for a purpose inadmissible under the rules of evidence. See RONALD J. ALLEN,
RICHARD B. KuHNs & ELEANOR SWIFT, EVIDENCE 163-164 (2d ed. 1997).
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risk that the jury will have a particular problem in estimating the
probative force of an item of evidence.,
49
Trial judges are used to assessing the potentially misleading-
meaning difficult for the jury to evaluate-nature of courtroom
evidence such as technical, scientific terminology, and complex
statistics and probabilistic statements. Trial judges will do better at
evaluating the risk of admitting legal theories and legalistic
terminology in pleadings by applying the "misleading the jury"
standard than by applying the complicating and conclusory categories
of the law versus fact test that Professor Clark proposes."
Unauthorized Admissions. A second danger described by
Professor Clark is that a party's prior pleading may have been
involuntary or not intended by the party to be an assertion, if, for
example, the attorney acts in bad faith and drafts a pleading against
the party's wishes." This, he says, could be prejudicial 2
Again, unfair prejudice is not the best doctrinal tool to use to
evaluate this danger. Agency problems between attorney and client
certainly lower the probative value of a factual allegation that is
offered to impeach the client's (the party's) dishonesty, and this
should be taken into account. Or, if the unauthorized allegation is
offered for its truth, it may be unfair to hold the client to it. Concern
about an agent's authority can defeat the application of the hearsay
exemption for authorized admissions-Rule 801(d)(2)-that is
necessary to admit the prior pleading as substantive evidence.
Thus, applying Rule 403 may require exploration of the
attorney's basis in fact, and in authority, to make an allegation. This
will not result in an extensive mini-trial that is extraneous to the
underlying dispute, but will shed light on the probative value of the
allegation; on the risk that its real meaning will escape, and thus
mislead, the jury; and on the propriety of applying the authorized
admission exemption. The party who wishes to undertake this
exploration in order to bar the admission of his own prior pleading
will have the ability to do so by waiving the attorney-client privilege.
Conclusion
This comment thus returns to the place where it began-with
admission and exclusion of prior pleadings primarily governed by
Rules 401, 402, and 403. This is the most sensible approach when the
dispute over a bright line rule of exclusion cannot be resolved on any
49. Id. at 165.
50. See Clark, supra note 1, at 582-89.
51. See id. at 588.
52. See id.
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grounds. The journey is worth it if, in the process of trying to resolve
that dispute, we better understand and appreciate the original place
to which we return.

